Optimal taxation and the skill premium by Angelopoulos, Konstantinos et al.
scottish institute for research in economics
SIRE DISCUSSION PAPER
SIRE-DP-2012-03
Optimal taxation and the skill premium 
Konstantinos Angelopoulos
University of Glasgow
James Malley
University of Glasgow and CESifo
Apostolis Philippopoulos
Athens University of Economics & Business, CESifo
www.sire.ac.uk
Optimal taxation and the skill premium
Konstantinos Angelopoulos
University of Glasgow
James Malley
University of Glasgow and CESifo
Apostolis Philippopoulos
Athens University of Economics & Business, CESifo
January 10, 2012
Abstract
The stylized facts suggest a negative relationship between tax progres-
sivity and the skill premium from the early 1960s until the early 1990s, and
a positive one thereafter. They also generally imply rising tax progressivity,
except for the 1980s. In this paper, we ask whether optimal tax policy is
consistent with these observations, taking into account the demographic and
technological factors that have also a¤ected the skill premium. To this end,
we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the skill premium
and the progressivity of the tax system are endogenously determined, with
the latter being optimally chosen by a benevolent government. We nd that
optimal policy delivers both a progressive tax system and model predictions
which are generally consistent, except for the 1980s, with the stylized facts
relating to the skill premium and progressivity. To capture the patterns in
the data over the 1980s requires that we adopt a government policy which
is biased towards the interests of skilled agents. Thus, in addition to demo-
graphic and technological factors, changes in the preferences of policy-makers
appear to be a potentially important factor in determining the evolution of
the observed skill premium.
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1 Introduction
The evolution and determinants of excess returns to skilled labor have been
extensively researched over the past several decades (see e.g. Hornstein et
al. (2005) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011) for reviews of this literature). To
explain the movements in the U.S. skill premium depicted in Figure 1 below,
the literature has concentrated on the importance of relative skill supply and
skill-biased productivity change (see e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992), Cummins
and Violante (2002), Krusell et al. (2000) and Autor et al. (2008)).1 Ceteris
paribus, an increase in the supply of skilled relative to unskilled labor tends to
decrease the skill premium, whereas technological innovations that increase
the productivity of capital raise the relative productivity of skilled labor and
in turn the skill premium. To explain the relative stability and decline of the
skill premium up to the early 1980s, the dominance of demographic versus
technological factors is often cited, whereas the rise in the skill premium from
the early 1980s is mainly attributed to the relative strength of investment
specic technological change.
[Figure 1 here]
The benchmark model used in the skill premium literature allows for
two types of labor, skilled and unskilled, which exhibit di¤erent degrees of
complementarity with capital. One strand of recent research has focused on
extending this canonical model by endogenizing skilled labour supply and
technical change and another on explaining di¤erent characteristics of the
distribution of wages and wage inequality over time (see e.g. Hornstein et
al. (2005) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011) for reviews and extensions). The
part played by economic policy in determining the observed evolution of the
skill premium has also been considered. For instance, Cozzi and Impullitti
(2010) analyze the role of scal policy and technical change, while Card
and DiNardo (2002) and Lemieux (2006) examine the e¤ects of minimum
wage legislation. However, economic policy is not only a potential cause but
may also be a result of wage inequality. This is probably most evident in
policy choices relating to optimal tax design which depend on the underlying
income inequality in the population (see e.g. the review papers by Mankiw
1Empirically, the skill premium is typically dened as the ratio of the wage rate of
university educated workers relative to the wage rate of workers without tertiary education
and the relative skill supply as the ratio of the skilled to unskilled labour force. The labour
market data used in Figure 1 are from Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and the technical
progress data are from Cummins and Violante (2002). More details on these data are
provided later.
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et al. (2009) and Diamond and Saez (2011)).2
A well documented feature of the US tax system is its increasing progres-
sivity until the early 1980s, a sharp fall over the 1980s and a reversal back
to rising progressivity from the 1990s (see e.g. Gouveia and Strauss (1994)
and Piketty and Saez (1997)). These trends can clearly be seen in Figure 2
by examining the movement in the relative tax rates.3 The fall in progressiv-
ity over the 1980s is usually attributed to policy reforms undertaken during
the Reagan administration, in particular the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981.
[Figure 2 here]
Figure 2 further suggests that the relationship between the skill premium
and the progressivity of the tax system is negative until the early 1990s, and
positive thereafter. In this paper, we examine whether optimal tax policy
can help us to capture this stylized fact in a model where both the progres-
sivity of the tax system and the skill premium are endogenously determined.
Our approach allows for a feedback e¤ect from optimal tax policy to the
skill premium via the heterogeneities in marginal propensities to save and
skill-biased capital accumulation. This creates an extra channel for tax pol-
icy to redistribute income and thus increases the e¤ectiveness of progressive
taxation.
For example, when skill and returns to skill are exogenous, as typically as-
sumed in the optimal taxation literature, the government supports the poorer
by taxing the rich more, thus a¤ecting the after-tax labor income distribu-
tion. However, when the returns to skill are endogenous, as in our model, an
increase in the progressivity also results in decreased capital accumulation,
since the richer households also have higher marginal propensities to save.
This fall in the capital stock, in turn, increases the return to unskilled labor
and thus decreases the skill premium. Therefore, in our setup, progressive
taxation is more e¤ective in supporting the income of the poor, which implies
that the government can achieve its objectives with a milder progressivity.
To achieve our aims, we build on the benchmark model of skill hetero-
geneity, following e.g. Stokey (1996) and Krusell et al. (2000), where skilled
2The literature on optimal taxation has examined the progressivity of income taxes
under di¤erent assumptions. For example, Judd (1985) shows that, in the long-run, capital
income should not be taxed, whereas labor income must be positively taxed, even if capital
is held by a subset of the population. This result implies that optimal taxation should be
regressive with respect to income. On the other hand, skill (or ability) heterogeneity is
expected to lead to optimal progressive taxes (see e.g. Conesa et. al. (2009)).
3The tax rate data used in Figure 2 are from Piketty and Saez (2007). High, middle
and low refer to the average tax for households in the 80-100, 40-80 and 0-40 percentiles
respectively.
3
labor complements capital more than unskilled labor, and extend it to allow
for heterogeneity in capital holdings, given that wage inequality and wealth
inequality are positively related.4 In particular, we assume three types of
agents, to reproduce the high-, middle- and low-income brackets in the tax
system shown in Figure 2. We further assume that high- and middle-income
earners supply skilled labor, whereas low-income earners supply unskilled la-
bor. We allow for heterogeneity in marginal propensities to save and asset
holdings by letting agents face di¤erent costs in accessing the nancial mar-
kets, following the insights of the literature on credit constraints and income
inequality (see e.g. Aghion and Howitt (1998)). Finally, the tax code allows
the average tax rate to increase with pre-tax income, as is e.g. Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1980). The progressivity, or regressivity, of the tax code is opti-
mally chosen by a government that has access to a commitment technology
and maximises the weighted average of the lifetime utility of the three agents.
When the model is calibrated to the existing skill and asset heterogeneity
in the US data, we show that a Benthamite government will choose an optimal
progressive tax system that is quantitatively similar to the existing US tax
structure. We also establish that our model matches the predictions of the
literature on the skill premium, i.e. ceteris paribus increases in the relative
supply of skilled labor and capital augmenting technical change lead to falls
and rises in the skill premium respectively. Moreover, we nd that optimal
tax policy reacts to such increases in the skill supply and capital-augmenting
technology, by decreasing and increasing respectively the progressivity of the
tax system.
The analysis of the data suggests that we can distinguish three distinct
sub-periods when examining the patterns in the skill premium and the pro-
gressivity of the tax system, i.e. 1966-1979, 1980-1990 and 1991-2000. We
empirically evaluate the model, under the assumption of a Benthamite gov-
ernment, by subjecting it to the observed joint changes in the capital aug-
menting technology and the relative skill supply parameters. We nd that
the model generally replicates the main patterns in the data regarding the
skill premium and the progressivity of the tax system for the rst and last
sub-period.
However, to capture the patterns in the data during the 1980s requires
that we depart from the assumption of a Benthamite government and in-
stead consider partisan preferences (see e.g. Mueller (2003, ch. 19) for a
review of the evidence relating to partizan e¤ects on economic policy over
4The data suggest that the households with higher asset wealth, also earn, on average,
higher labor income (see e.g. the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data analysed
in Garcia-Mila et. al. (2010)).
4
the 1980s). In particular, the stylized facts depicted in Figures 1 and 2 from
1980-1990 can be captured by assuming a bias towards the interests of skilled
labor. Hence, changes in the preferences of policy-makers, in addition to the
demographic and technological factors pointed out by the literature to date,
appear to be an important factor in determining the evolution of the observed
skill premium.
2 The Model
The economy is closed and inhabited by three heterogenous groups of house-
holds, rms and a government. The di¤erentiated households di¤er with
respect to their capital holdings and the type of labor services they pro-
vide. The former is driven by capital market imperfections implying that
equilibrium investment will remain unequal across di¤erent groups revealing
their di¤erent access to capital markets. The latter is reected by high- and
middle-income households o¤ering skilled labor and low-income households
providing unskilled labor. Moreover, skilled labor is assumed to be relatively
more complementary to capital than unskilled labor. As a result, when cap-
ital rises, the skill wage premium also rises. Economic policy is chosen by a
Ramsey government.
2.1 Economic agents and their roles
All households consume, work and can save in the form of capital subject to
di¤erent capital transaction costs. Households also own the rms and receive
prots which, due to constant returns to scale, are zero in equilibrium. Firms
employ capital, skilled labor and unskilled labor to produce a single prod-
uct. The government uses an income tax to nance utility-enhancing public
spending, where the tax code allows for progressive or regressive taxation.
All households have the same tastes so that they di¤er solely with respect to
their economic roles or equivalently their sources of income.
2.2 Population composition
Total population size, N , is exogenous and constant. Among N , Nh < N
are high-income households, Nm < N are middle-income households, and the
rest, N l = N   Nh   Nm, are low-income households, where the subscripts
h = 1; 2; :::; Nh, m = 1; 2; :::; Nm and l = 1; 2; :::; N l denote the three groups.
Private rms are identical and indexed by the subscript f = 1; 2; :::; N f . We
assume that the number of rms equals the number of households, N = N f ,
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or that each household owns one rm. We take this population composition
as given. Finally, it is useful for what follows, to dene the population shares
Nh=N  nh, Nm=N  nm and N l=N  nl = 1  nh   nm.
2.3 Households
The objective of each household of type i  h;m; l is to maximize:
1P
t=0
tui;t
 
Ci;t; zi;t; Gt

(1)
where Ci;t and zi;t are respectively household is consumption and leisure;
Gt is dened as average government services (i.e. total public consumption
services divided by total population, N); and 0 <  < 1 is the discount rate.
The period utility function, ui;t(:), is increasing and strictly concave in all
arguments. Following e.g. Conesa et al. (2009), the form we employ for the
period utility function is:
ui;t
 
Ci;t; zi;t; Gt

=
C
1 1
i;t
1  1
+ 1
zi;t
1 2
1  2
+ 2
Gt
1 3
1  3
(2)
where (1; 2; 1; 2; 3) > 0 are preference parameters. As noted by Conesa
et al. (2009), this additively separable specication allows, consistent with
the micro-evidence, relatively low labor supply elasticities to be adopted.
We dene the pre-tax (capital and labor) income of each household of
type i  h;m; l as:
Yi;t  (rt   )Ki;t + i;t + wjt li;t (3)
where Ki;t is the beginning-of-period capital held by each household type; rt
is the return to Ki;t; w
j
t is the wage rate with j = s for types i = h;m and
j = u for type i = l; li;t and zi;t = 1  li;t are respectively hours of work and
leisure for each household type; i;t is rmsdividends per household type;
0 <  < 1 is the capital depreciation rate; and Kh;0 > Km;0 > Kl;0 > 0 are
given.
We assume that each household type pays di¤erent intermediation or
transaction premia due to imperfections in the capital market. Using capital
market imperfections to help explain agent heterogeneity has been exten-
sively employed by the income inequality literature (see e.g. Galor and Zeira
(1993), Bénabou (1996) and Aghion and Howitt (1998, ch. 9)). In partic-
ular, we follow e.g. Persson and Tabellini (1992) and Benigno (2009) and
assume a quadratic function such that a cost of 'iK
2
i;t maintains for hold-
ing physical capital Ki;t, where the parameter 'i > 0 measures the size of
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the transaction cost. We assume that higher incomes provide an insider
advantage in nancial transactions due, for instance, to past experience, so-
cioeconomic background, networks, etc., leading to transaction costs, which
are rank-ordered as follows 'h < 'm < 'l.
Therefore, in each period, the budget constraint of each household i is:
Ci;t +Ki;t+1  Ki;t + iK2i;t = Yi;t   T (Yi;t) (4)
where the function T (Yi;t) refers to taxes paid to the government by each
household type.5 Each household i, taking factor prices and policy variables
as given, chooses fCi;t; li;t; Ki;t+1g1t=0 to maximize (1) subject to (4) and the
time constraint.
2.4 Firms
Firms use three factors of production (capital, skilled labor and unskilled
labor). Each rm, f , maximizes prots:
f;t = Yf;t   rtKf;t   wst lsf;t   wut luf;t (5)
where Yf;t is the rms output and Kf;t, lsf;t and l
u
f;t are respectively the
inputs of capital, skilled labor and unskilled labor employed by each rm
f at t: Following e.g. Stokey (1996), we assume that the rms production
function is given by:
Yf;t = A

(AkKf;t)
 + (1  ) (luf;t)
= 
lsf;t
1 
(6)
where A > 0 and Ak > 0 are neutral and capital augmenting technology
respectively; and 0 < ;  < 1 and  > 0 are technology parameters. This
form captures the idea that capital is a substitute for unskilled labor, while
skilled labor complements both capital and unskilled labor. When  = 1,
capital and unskilled labor are perfect substitutes, whereas when  = 0, the
function becomes a Cobb-Douglas for all inputs.
2.5 Government budget constraint
Assuming a balanced budget in each period, we have:
NGt = N
hT (Yh;t) +N
mT (Ym;t) +N
lT (Yl;t). (7)
5Note that the tax function is dened below when we present the government sector.
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Following, e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), the income tax function, T (Yi;t),
combines a at marginal tax rate with a transfer to all individuals:
T (Yi;t) =  tYi;t  Rt (8)
where  t and Rt are policy instruments.6 That is, 0 <  t < 1 is the mar-
ginal tax rate and Rt (when positive) is the minimum income guaranteed by
the government. This function allows for progressive taxation in the sense
that the average tax rate increases with pre-tax income. Note that for the
government budget constraint to be satised only two of the three policy
instruments,  t; Rt; and Gt can be set independently.
2.6 Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium (DCE)
In the DCE, all households maximize welfare, all rms maximize prots, the
markets for capital, skilled and unskilled labor, dividends and goods clear
and all constraints are satised. This is for any feasible policy and initial
conditions for the state variables. The ten optimality conditions summarizing
the DCE are presented in the Appendix.
2.7 Ramsey policy and equilibrium
The government chooses policy instruments, f t; Rt; Gtg1t=0, to maximize a
weighted average of the three agentswelfare functions:
!h
1P
t=0
tuh
 
Ch;t; lh;t; Gt

+ !m
1P
t=0
tum
 
Cm;t; lm;t; Gt

+ (9)
+(1  !h   !m)
1P
t=0
tul
 
Cl;t; ll;t; Gt

subject to the DCE conditions presented in the Appendix. The xed para-
meters 0  !h; !m  1 are the utility preference weights. In the Benthamite
case, !h = nh; !m = nm and (1  !h   !m) = nl.
3 Stylized facts, calibration and solution
In this section, we further examine the data regarding the skill premium and
the progressivity of the tax system. This discussion informs the calibration
6Imposing a at tax with a universal lump-sum transfer is clearly a restriction on tax
policy and is used here for simplicity (see e.g. Diamond and Saez (2011) for a discussion
of the "optimal" tax formula). However, it allows us to capture, in a model with a stylized
skill heterogeneity, the overall progressivity of the tax system and its relationship with the
skill premium.
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which aims to reproduce the main stylized facts over the entire sample pe-
riod, 1966-2000.7 It also helps to contexualize the comparative static analysis
of the next section which, under di¤erent assumptions regarding demogra-
phy, technology and political preferences, aims to match the key empirical
observations over 1966-1979, 1980-1990 and 1991-2000.
3.1 Stylized facts
In Table 1 we summarize the main empirical observations regarding tax rates,
the skill premium, relative skill supply and capital augmenting technical
change. Referring to the tax rates data in Table 1, the rst point to note is
that the progressivity of the US tax system is reected by the relationship
between the e¤ective average tax rates applying to the three income groups
considered, i.e. h > m >  l8. A convenient way to measure the extent of
the progressivity of the tax system is to look at the ratios of the tax rates
that apply to the di¤erent income groups, which are denoted as h=m, h= l
and m= l. We also report the ratio of the e¤ective tax rate that applies to
skilled labor relative to unskilled, as h;m= l.9 In general, an increase in
these ratios captures an increase in the progressivity of the tax system, with
respect to the income distribution that we consider.
The averages of the tax rates and their ratios over each period suggest
that the progressivity of the tax system has generally increased and more
markedly so in the 1990s. However, the average levels over the sub-periods
mask di¤erent growth trends within these periods, which becomes apparent
when we examine Figure 2. In particular, progressivity was increasing over
1966-1979, decreasing over 1980-1990 and then again increasing over 1991-
2000. This can be seen by referring to the average growth rates of the tax
ratios, denoted as g

h
m

, g

h
 l

, g
 
m
 l

and g

h;m
 l

in Table 1. These
ratios have generally been increasing over the periods considered, with the
notable exception of the 1980s, where all measures suggest a declining pro-
gressivity. As pointed out in the Introduction, this fall in progressivity has
been attributed to policy reforms undertaken during the Economic Recovery
7Note that the start date is restricted by the tax data and the end date by the techno-
logical change data referred to in Figures 1 and 2.
8As noted earlier, the data used to construct the measures reported in Table 1 are
obtained from Piketty and Saez (2007). The h rate is the e¤ective average tax rate that
applies to the top quantile, m has been calculated as the average tax rate of the second
and third quantiles, while  l has been calculated as the average tax rate of the fourth and
fth quantiles.
9The e¤ective tax rate that applies to skilled labour (h;m) is calculated as the weighted
average of the h and m tax rates.
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Tax Act of 1981 (see, e.g. the discussion in Gouveia and Strauss (1994).10
Table 1: Historical Data
1966-2000 1966-1979 1980-1990 1991-2000
Levels and relative tax rates
h 0.2914 0.2760 0.2925 0.3116
m 0.2175 0.2085 0.2249 0.2218
 l 0.1524 0.1614 0.1544 0.1376
h=m 1.3401 1.3249 1.3005 1.4050
h= l 1.9347 1.7148 1.8980 2.2828
m= l 1.4397 1.2951 1.4588 1.6209
h;m= l 1.6047 1.4350 1.6052 1.8415
Skill premium and relative skill supply
ws=wu 1.6336 1.5444 1.6003 1.8076
(nh + nm) =nl 1.5547 1.4251 1.6024 1.6987
Growth rates (g) and correlations ()
g

h
m

0.0009 -0.0018 -0.0054 0.0109
g

h
 l

0.0124 0.0161 -0.0134 0.0267
g
 
m
 l

0.0115 0.0180 -0.0081 0.0157
g

h;m
 l

0.0119 0.0172 -0.0102 0.0201
g
 
ws
wu

0.0062 -0.0014 0.0118 0.0074
g

nh+nm
nl

0.0073 0.0093 0.0059 0.0046
g (Ak) 0.0309 0.0150 0.0318 0.0430


ws
wu
; 
h
m

0.5682 -0.1155 -0.7076 0.8385


ws
wu
; 
h
 l

0.6917 -0.5815 -0.9344 0.7963

 
ws
wu
; 
m
 l

0.6399 -0.5332 -0.8911 0.7348


ws
wu
; 
h;m
 l

0.6696 -0.5633 -0.9235 0.7685
The next observation in Table 1 relates to the evolution of the skill pre-
mium and its main determinants, i.e. capital augmenting technical change
and the relative supply of skilled workers, which have also been plotted in
Figure 1. The technical change data, obtained from Cummins and Violante
(2002), denoted by g (Ak) for the average growth rate, suggest that capital-
augmenting technology has been increasing over the whole period at an in-
10Note that the income distribution that we consider (i.e. top 20%, middle 40% and low
40%) blurs the evolution of the top income tax rates that apply to the highest percentiles
(e.g. the top 1%). As Piketty and Saez (2007) show, there has been a consistent reduction
in these tax rates over the whole time period that we consider.
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creasing rate.11 The skill supply and skill premium data are from Acemoglu
and Autor (2011) and have been extensively analysed in e.g. Autor et al.
(2008) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011).12 As evidenced by g

nh+nm
nl

over
the three sub-periods considered, Table 1 shows that the relative skill sup-
ply has been increasing over the whole period, but at a decreasing rate. The
skill premium, ws=wu, on the other hand, decreased over the rst sub-period,
while it increased after 1980, see e.g. g
 
ws
wu

in Table 1.
The above changes in the progressivity of the tax system and the skill
premium suggest that there should be a negative relationship between these
two series over the rst two sub-periods and a positive relationship in the
third. This is indeed conrmed when we look at the correlations between the
skill premium and the ratios of the tax rates, shown in the last four rows of
Table 1. It is useful to note, however, that the underlying relationship is not
the same over the rst two sub-periods, despite the negative correlation in
both cases. In particular, over 1966-1979, progressivity has been increasing,
while the skill premium has been decreasing. On the other hand, over 1980-
1990, progressivity has been decreasing, while the skill premium has been
increasing. Therefore, these two sub-periods di¤er fundamentally in the re-
lationship between progressivity and the skill premium, which motivates us
to examine them separately in the next section.
3.2 Calibration
The model parameters, reported in Table 2, are calibrated so that the model
generally captures the data averages over the whole period, 1966-2000, re-
ported in Table 1 above and Table 3 below. The population shares are chosen
so that the three income groups in the model correspond to the high-, middle-
and low-income groups shown in the data. Therefore, we set nh, nm and nl
to 0.2, 0.4 and 0.4 respectively and assume that the high- and middle-income
groups supply skilled labor and own a larger share of aggregate capital. The
rst assumption implies a relative skill supply of 1.5, which is consistent with
the data average reported in Table 1. To capture the wealth distribution in
the data, we calibrate the transaction cost parameters, so that m = 2:5h
11To construct this measure, we follow He (2011) and use the quality-adjusted price
index of total investment (in equipment and structures) and the o¢ cial NIPA price index of
consumption (nondurable and services) from Cummins and Violante (2002). The resulting
capital augmenting technology index was also re-intialized at 1966.
12Following Autor et. al. (2008) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011), the relative skill
supply is calculated as the ratio of college equivalent to non-college equivalent labour
supply in e¢ ciency units. The skill premium is dened as the ratio of college to high
school wages. Note that in Figure 1 we plot the natural logarithms of these ratios.
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and l = 5 h, which implies that high-income households own two and a
half times as much capital stock as the middle-income households and ve
times as much as the low-income households. This again coheres with PSID
data from the 80s (see e.g. Garcia-Milà et al. (2010)) and US Census data
from the 90s (see e.g. Eller and Fraser (1995)). Implicitly, our model and
calibration assume that more skilled households also own more assets, which
is, on average, similar to PSID data on average wages for di¤erent wealth
groups (see e.g. Table 2 in Garcia-Milà et al. (2010)). The size of transac-
tion costs, as captured by h, is calibrated so that, given a commonly used
depreciation parameter and rate of time preference, it implies a steady-state
total capital to output ratio that is consistent with the data.13
The levels of total factor productivity and capital augmenting technology
are both normalised to unity. The parameters ,  and  are important
in determining the skill premium, as they a¤ect the returns to capital and
the two types of labor, as well as the complementarity between the three
factors. We follow Stokey (1996) and set  and  to 0.5 and 0.4 respectively.
The latter implies an elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled
labor, 1=(1 ), of 2, which is well within the range of estimated elasticities of
substitution reported in the literature (see e.g. Stokey (1996) and Hornstein
et al. (2005) for reviews of these studies). The remaining parameter in
the production function, , is set to 0.5, to match the average level of skill
premium in the data.
Table 2: Parameters
A Ak   1 2 3  1
1.000 1.000 0.500 0.972 2.500 2.500 2.500 0.083 1.920
2   h m l nh nm nl
0.025 0.500 0.400 0.0015 h2.5 h5 0.200 0.400 0.400
The weight on leisure relative to private consumption, 1, is as in Conesa
et al. (2009). We calibrate the weight given to public relative to private
consumption, 2, to obtain a public consumption spending to output ratio
of about 16%. Finally, the curvature parameters, 1; 2; 3, in the utility
function are set in the middle of the commonly employed range, i.e. (2  3).
3.3 Steady-state
Assuming Benthamite policy, the steady-state solution of the model is de-
tailed in Table 3. We report the solution for the two policy instruments, 
and R, together with the implied e¤ective average tax rates for each type of
13The values of  = 8:33% and  = 0:972 are as in Conesa et. al. (2009).
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agent and the resulting tax ratios that measure the progressivity of the tax
system along with data averages for the available measures.
Table 3: Steady-State
Data Model
Tax rates & skill premium
 n.a. 0.3530
R n.a. 0.0453
h 0.2914 0.2570
m 0.2175 0.2298
 l 0.1524 0.1622
h=m 1.3401 1.1183
h= l 1.9347 1.5845
m= l 1.4397 1.4169
h;m= l 1.6047 1.3174
ws=wu 1.6336 1.6154
Asset distribution & Frish elasticities
Kh=Km 2.2180 2.5000
Kh=Kl 4.7188 5.0000
Km=Kl 2.1278 2.0000
fh n.a. 0.4311
fm n.a. 0.3790
fl n.a. 0.3019
The rst result that can be seen in Table 3 is that the assumed hetero-
geneities imply an optimal progressive tax system, which has qualitative and
quantitative features that are similar to the data averages. This is an impor-
tant prediction of the model. As discussed earlier, under skill heterogeneity,
optimal tax policy has already been shown to be progressive (see e.g. Conesa
et al. (2009) and Diamond and Saez (2011) for a review). However, here we
also allow the government to optimally a¤ect the skill premium and thus pre-
tax wage inequality. Therefore, optimal progressive taxation is obtained for
a Benthamite government that endogenizes the feedback e¤ect of its policies
on the returns to skill and income distribution.
The feedback e¤ect creates an extra channel for tax policy to redistribute
income and thus increases the e¤ectiveness of progressive taxation. In partic-
ular, when skill and returns to skill are exogenous, as typically assumed in the
optimal taxation literature, the government supports the poorer by taxing
the rich more, thus a¤ecting the after-tax labor income distribution. How-
ever, when the returns to skill are endogenous, as in our model, an increase
in the progressivity also results in decreased capital accumulation, since the
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richer households also have higher marginal propensities to save. This fall in
the capital stock, in turn, increases the return for unskilled labor and thus
decreases the skill premium. Therefore, in our setup, progressive taxation is
more e¤ective in supporting the income of the poor, which implies that the
government can achieve its objectives with a milder progressivity.
The level of the e¤ective tax rates predicted by the model is similar to
that in the data for the middle and low income groups, but is lower, compared
to the data for the top income group, which also implies that the predicted
progressivity is somewhat smaller than in the data. However, if the very high
tax rates that apply to the top 1% of the distribution are excluded from the
calculation of h, the data averages for all tax rates are very similar to the
model predictions (see e.g. Piketty and Saez (2007)).
Note also that the implications of the modeling assumptions and calibra-
tion cohere with the average skill premium and asset heterogeneity present in
the data. Moreover, consistent with the ndings from the microeconometric
literature (see e.g. Browning et al. (1999)), the model produces Frish labor
supply elasticities that are less than one.
4 Optimal progressivity and the skill premium
4.1 Model predictions
We rst examine the predictions of the model relating to the skill premium
and optimal tax policy with respect to exogenous changes in the relative
skill supply, capital augmenting technology and government preferences. As
pointed out in the introduction, the literature suggests that the rst two
factors are important determinants of the skill premium. However, the re-
sponse of the optimal tax policy to these changes has not been examined
previously. Moreover, although political preferences have been linked to the
tax system in the political economy literature (see e.g. Drazen (2000), Pers-
son and Tabellini (2000), Mueller (2003) and Winer and Hettich (2003) for
reviews of this literature), their e¤ect on the skill premium via the choice of
the progressivity of the tax system has also not been systematically studied.
The model predictions for the steady-state solution with respect to the
changes in the relevant parameters are presented in Table 4. We rst present
the solution for the base parameterization explained above, followed by the
results obtained by a 1% rise in the relative skill supply, the capital augment-
ing technology and the weight for skilled households in the governments ob-
jective function.14 To facilitate the discussion of the results, we also present,
14Note that results obtained from decreases in the above factors are symmetric and thus
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for each case, the percent deviation from the base solution for the skill pre-
mium and the progressivity measures.
Table 4: Model Predictions
Base 1% rise in: 1% rise in: 1% rise in:
(nh + nm) =nl Ak !h + !m
Tax rates & skill premium
 0.3530 0.3486 0.3557 0.3489
R 0.0453 0.0442 0.0461 0.0442
h 0.2570 0.2551 0.2579 0.2554
m 0.2298 0.2285 0.2303 0.2289
 l 0.1622 0.1634 0.1611 0.1629
h=m 1.1183 1.1164 1.1202 1.1157
h= l 1.5845 1.5608 1.6007 1.5675
m= l 1.4169 1.3980 1.4290 1.4049
h;m= l 1.3174 1.3042 1.3261 1.3085
ws=wu 1.6154 1.6055 1.6187 1.6187
Asset distribution & Frish elasticities
Kh=Y 0.8972 0.9038 0.8989 0.8998
Km=Y 0.7177 0.7230 0.7191 0.7198
Kl=Y 0.3589 0.3579 0.3595 0.3599
fh 0.4311 0.4305 0.4332 0.4305
fm 0.3790 0.3782 0.3806 0.3784
fl 0.3019 0.3012 0.3031 0.3006
Progressivity & skill premium relative to basebd  h=m 0.0000 -0.0017 0.0017 -0.0023bd  h= l 0.0000 -0.0150 0.0102 -0.0108bd  m= l 0.0000 -0.0133 0.0085 -0.0085bd  h;m= l 0.0000 -0.0100 0.0066 -0.0067bd (ws=wu) 0.0000 -0.0061 0.0020 0.0020
4.1.1 Demographic changes
Other things equal, an increase in the relative supply of skilled labor is ex-
pected to lead to a fall in the skill premium, which is indeed conrmed in
Table 4. These results also show that a Benthamite government nds it op-
timal to decrease the progressivity of the tax system. The fall in the skill
premium implies that wage inequality falls and thus the incentive for the gov-
ernment to redistribute income through tax policy is weaker. Moreover, given
not presented here to save on space.
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that a larger proportion of the population is now skilled, the Benthamite gov-
ernment places relatively greater weight on the welfare of the skilled income
groups. Therefore, both factors contribute to a less progressive tax system.
4.1.2 Technology changes
Ceteris paribus, an improvement in capital augmenting technology, since it
is skill-biased, is expected to increase the skill premium. This is reected in
Table 4 which also shows that the optimal response of policy is to increase
the progressivity of the tax system. A rise in the skill premium implies
an increase in wage inequality. Thus a Benthamite government will nd
it optimal to increase the progressivity of taxation to redress this negative
income e¤ect on the unskilled.
It is noteworthy that in both comparative static exercises considered thus
far, the progressivity of the tax system and the skill premium should move in
the same direction. That is, other things equal, the model with a Benthamite
government suggests that there should be a positive relationship between the
progressivity and the skill premium.
4.1.3 Government preference changes
Governments need not have Benthamite preferences. For instance, if govern-
ments have partisan incentives, they might choose to support one popula-
tion group more than another (see e.g. Drazen (2000) Persson and Tabellini
(2000), Mueller (2003) and Winer and Hettich (2003) for reviews of this liter-
ature)). Other things equal, an increase in the weight for skilled households
in the governments objective function is expected to lead to a fall in the
progressivity of the tax system which is again conrmed in Table 4. More-
over, as the results in Table 4 make clear, this policy change also has e¤ects
on the skill premium via the feedback e¤ect of the progressivity of the tax
system. In particular, given the decline in the progressivity of the income
tax, capital accumulation has increased. In turn, this benets skilled labor
more than unskilled, given the higher complementarity of the former with
capital. In other words, falls in the progressivity of the tax system, driven
by preferential treatment of high income groups by the government, will be
skill-biased and thus increase the skill premium. In this sense, their e¤ect on
the skill premium is similar to the e¤ect of capital augmenting technology.
However, it is interesting to note that such political changes result in a nega-
tive relationship between the skill premium and progressivity, since increases
in progressivity result in decreases in the skill premium and vice-versa.
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4.2 Political preferences, taxation & the skill premium
Having established the model predictions and the main properties in the data
regarding the relationship between the skill premium and the progressivity
of the tax system, we now turn to evaluate whether the patterns in the data
cohere with Benthamite policy, or, whether there is evidence that political
preferences have contributed to the skill premium.15 The analysis of the data
in the previous section suggests that we can distinguish three sub-periods
when examining the patterns in the skill premium and the progressivity of
the tax system, 1966-1979, 1980-1990 and 1991-2000. We therefore subject
the base calibration to joint changes in the capital augmenting technology
and the relative skill supply parameters that match the average change in
the data for each of these sub-periods.
The results from such counter-factual experiments are presented in Table
5, where, for ease of comparison, we again present the base calibration results
in the rst column and denote the percent deviation between the base and the
new steady-state solution by bd (:).16 These ndings suggest that the general
patterns in the skill premium and progressivity in the data are consistent
with optimal, Benthamite policy over 1966-1979 and 1991-2000, but not over
the middle period, 1980-1990.
More specically, using actual changes in capital augmenting technology
and relative skill supply for the 1966-1979 period, the model predicts a decline
in the skill premium and a rise in the progressivity of the tax system as found
in the data. Moreover, we next nd that the model predictions for the 1991-
2000 period are broadly consistent with the data, i.e. both the skill premium
and the progressivity of the tax system rise. For both the 1966-1979 and 1991-
2000 periods, the predicted decline/rise in the skill premium is quantitatively
similar to what is observed in the data as well. Finally, for the 1991-2000
period, the predicted increase in h;m= l is close to the data, but the model
15Here, we take asset and skill heterogeneity, as well as capital augmenting technology,
as given and thus una¤ected by governments policy. In general, government policy can
a¤ect both capital augmenting technology and the relative skill supply (see e.g. Cozzi and
Impulliti (2010) and He and Liu (2008), respectively). In our empirical evaluation of the
model, we control for the quantitative importance of these forcing variables by calibrating
the model to the observed changes in both.
16Note that the data presented in Table 1 referred to the average growth rate of the skill
premium and the measures of the progressivity of the tax system over each sub-period. To
make our results comparable to those averages, we obtain the new steady-state solutions
reported in Table 5, given a change in the parameters that capture the average growth
in relative skill supply and capital augmenting technology. We then calculate the percent
deviation between the base and the new steady-state solution for the skill premium and
the tax progressivity measures.
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under-predicts the change in the progressivity in the 1966-979 period.17
In contrast to the above nding, in the 1980-1990 period, the model pre-
dicts a rise in both the skill premium and the progressivity of the tax system,
contrary to the negative relationship between these variables recorded in the
data. In particular, the rise in the skill premium, driven by the quantitatively
dominant increase in capital augmenting technology, is signicantly lower in
the model than in the data. On the other hand, we observe a decline in
progressivity over the 1980s, which is inconsistent with a Benthamite gov-
ernment.
The observed pattern of a declining progressivity in a period of a rising
skill premium does cohere, however, with optimal policy chosen by a govern-
ment that has a partisan bias in favor of the skilled groups of the population.
More specically, if we add to the changes in capital augmenting technology
and relative skill supply, a rise in the relative weight to the skilled income
groups in the objective function of the government, the model can generate
optimal progressivity and skill premium patterns that are seen in the data.
This is shown in the last column in Table 5, where in addition to period
specic changes in relative skill supply and capital augmenting technology,
an increase in the weight to the skill groups of 3.5% is applied. The latter
captures a bias of the Republican governments over the eighties in favor of
higher income (or skilled) groups that is su¢ cient to generate a decline in
h;m= l by 1%.18 As can be seen, under such partisan preferences, the pro-
gressivity of the tax system declines in accordance with the data and this
allows the model to match the negative correlation between progressivity and
the skill premium. Moreover, the increase in the skill premium is even higher
under the skill-biased policy, due to the progressivity channel discussed in
the previous sub-section. As a result, the change in the skill premium is also
17Our setup cannot account for the average decline in h=m in this period, but this
seems to be an outlier in the data, driven by the very low computed e¤ective tax rates
for the middle income groups at the beginning of the period. Given that the main het-
erogeneity here derives from the skilled/unskilled decomposition, we focus our analysis in
this section on the relevant measure of progressivity, h;m= l.
18A partisan bias in economic policy in favor of higher income groups over the 1980s
has also been documented in the literature (see e.g. Mueller (2003, ch. 19)). However,
using this literature, it is di¢ cult to quantify this bias in a way that is consistent with
our model. Therefore, in the last column in Table 5 we demonstrate the potential of the
model to match the stylized facts, assuming a partisan bias su¢ ciently high to capture
the average observed decline in h;m= l by 1% over the 1980s.
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quantitatively consistent with the data.
Table 5 : Government Preferences
Benthamite Skill-biased
Base 1966-1979 1980-1990 1991-2000 1980-1990
Tax rates & skill premium
 0.3530 0.3530 0.3589 0.3623 0.3442
R 0.0453 0.0455 0.0472 0.0483 0.0433
h 0.2570 0.2567 0.2588 0.2601 0.2532
m 0.2298 0.2293 0.2304 0.2311 0.2273
 l 0.1622 0.1618 0.1596 0.1582 0.1624
h=m 1.1183 1.1195 1.1233 1.1256 1.1139
h= l 1.5845 1.5864 1.6220 1.6439 1.5592
m= l 1.4169 1.4171 1.4440 1.4605 1.3997
h;m= l 1.3174 1.3179 1.3371 1.3489 1.3044
ws=wu 1.6154 1.6112 1.6200 1.6249 1.6322
Asset distribution & Frish elasticities
Kh=Y 0.8972 0.9058 0.9063 0.9072 0.9156
Km=Y 0.7177 0.7247 0.7251 0.7258 0.7325
Kl=Y 0.3589 0.3590 0.3604 0.3612 0.3641
fh 0.4311 0.4336 0.4373 0.4397 0.4352
fm 0.3790 0.3807 0.3837 0.3855 0.3817
fl 0.3019 0.3031 0.3053 0.3067 0.3003
Progressivity & skill premium relative to basebd  h=m 0.0000 0.0010 0.0044 0.0065 -0.0039bd  h= l 0.0000 0.0012 0.0237 0.0375 -0.0160bd  m= l 0.0000 0.0001 0.0191 0.0308 -0.0121bd  h;m= l 0.0000 0.0004 0.0150 0.0239 -0.0098bd (ws=wu) 0.0000 -0.0026 0.0029 0.0059 0.0103
To summarise, by endogenizing tax policy, we nd evidence that, in ad-
dition to relative skill supply and capital augmenting technology, political
preferences have a¤ected the skill premium. This is particularly evident in
accounting for the patterns of the skill premium and progressivity in the
1980s, a period where room for non-market or policy inuences are widely
believed to have had an e¤ect on the skill premium (see e.g. Autor et al.
(2008)). At the same time, it is important to note that the political pref-
erences relating to the progressivity of the tax system in our setup do not
substitute for the market forces a¤ecting wage inequality. Instead, they work
through the supply and demand for skilled and unskilled labour by a¤ecting
their marginal productivities di¤erentially.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that a Benthamite government would choose
a progressive tax system when the main characteristics of asset and skill
inequality match the stylized facts of the US economy over the past 40 years.
By allowing the skill premium to be endogenously determined along with
tax policy, we have also demonstrated that the main characteristics of the
progressivity of income taxation in the US are consistent with optimal policy
chosen by a government that cares equally about all citizens. Moreover, our
results suggest that the progressivity of the optimally chosen tax system has
contributed to pre-tax wage inequality in addition to changes in skill supply
and capital-augmenting technology.
However, the assumption of a Benthamite government is not supported
by the data for the whole sample. In particular, the 1980s is consistent with
a tax policy that placed relatively greater weight on the welfare of the skilled
segments of the labor force. Therefore, to capture the stylized facts in this
period requires that we also allow for political economy considerations in the
form of partizan preferences on the part of the policymaker.
An obvious limitation of the current paper is that we have taken gov-
ernment preferences as given. Thus, to shed more light into the political
mechanism generating the observed politico-economic equilibrium, a useful
extension would be to examine the joint determination of the governments
preferences along with wage inequality and the skill premium. This might
be achieved in a model incorporating incentives for political parties to sup-
port their constituents as in the literature initiated by Persson and Tabellini
(1992, 1994) and Alesina and Rosenthal (1995).
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6 Appendix
The DCE is summarized by the following ten equations:
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Figure 1: Skill Premium, Relative Skill Supply and Productivity, 1966-2000
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Figure 2: Skill Premium and the Progressivity of Tax System, 1966-2000
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